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The Lowy Institute for International Policy is an independent policy think 
tank. Its mandate ranges across all the dimensions of international policy 
debate in Australia – economic, political and strategic – and it is not 
limited to a particular geographic region. Its two core tasks are to: 
• produce distinctive research and fresh policy options for Australia’s 
international policy and to contribute to the wider international debate. 
• promote discussion of Australia’s role in the world by providing an 
accessible and high-quality forum for discussion of Australian 
international relations through debates, seminars, lectures, dialogues 
and conferences. 
Funding to establish the G20 Studies Centre at the Lowy Institute for 
International Policy has been provided by the Australian Government. 
 
The views expressed in the contributions to this Monitor are entirely the
authors’ own and not those of the Lowy Institute for International Policy or
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OVERVIEW 
TRISTRAM SAINSBURY1 
The Turkish G20 Presidency has indicated that in 2015 the G20 will 
focus on ensuring inclusive and robust growth through collective action. 
In order to achieve this, Turkey has placed a special emphasis on the 
three ‘i’s: inclusiveness, implementation, and investment for growth. 
These priorities have the potential to lead to on-the-ground outcomes 
that help validate the G20’s reputation as the premier international 
economic forum. It is critical that practical steps are made. The 16th 
issue of the G20 Monitor examines the basis of the three ‘i’s, assesses 
progress made on the priorities, and suggests policies the G20 could 
pursue for each priority. It also explores the prospects for further G20 
attention on global health governance in light of the Ebola epidemic of 
2014. 
INCLUSIVENESS 
At the Brisbane G20 Leaders’ Summit, Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet 
Davutoğlu stated that “during our presidency we want to be the voice of 
everybody,” and that inclusiveness would be one of the defining aspects 
of the Turkish Presidency.2 The Turkish hosts seek to expand the G20’s 
central growth narrative such that G20 members strive for strong, 
sustainable, balanced, and inclusive growth. Turkey has organised the 
agenda so that G20 members are encouraged to focus on domestic 
initiatives that strengthen gender equality, support small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs), and address youth unemployment. At an 
international level, the inclusiveness agenda will aim to enhance the 
voice of low-income and developing countries.  
Turkey’s inclusiveness agenda draws from the substantial and growing 
body of literature produced by the IMF, OECD, World Bank, and G20 
countries, and has elicited the support of various civil society and 
business groups.3 As part of this agenda, the Turkish Presidency is also 
exploring the jobless growth phenomenon, and has initiated a discussion 
                                                
1 Research Fellow, G20 Studies Centre, Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
2 Jane Wardell, “Incoming G20 Leader Turkey Says Group Must Be More Inclusive,” 
Reuters, 13 November 2014, http://www.worldbulletin.net/news/149711/turkish-
presidency-of-g20-focuses-on-action-for-all. 
3 For example, see OECD, All on board: Making Inclusive Growth Happen, 2014; IMF, 
“IMF Agenda to Focus on Strong, Balanced and Inclusive Growth,” IMF Survey 
Magazine: Policy, 12 December 2013; Elena Iancovichina, and Susanna Lundstrom, 
“What is Inclusive Growth?,” World Bank Note, 10 February 2009; and European 
Commission, “Inclusive Growth — a High-Employment Economy Delivering Economic, 
Social and Territorial Cohesion,” accessed March 2015, 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/europe-2020-in-a-nutshell/priorities/inclusive-
growth/index_en.htm. 
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on the share of labour income in GDP, pledging to work with 
international organisations to understand the underlying factors.  
The inclusiveness agenda is part of a broader discussion of the links 
between growth and inequality. Larry Summers has been a prominent 
voice in this discussion, arguing recently that structural reform is 
essential in increasing both the number of people able and willing to 
work productively, and the productivity of workers and capital.4 He 
suggests that policies for growth should focus on infrastructure 
investment, immigration, family-friendly work, energy policy, and 
business tax reform. Much of this integrated approach to inclusive 
growth is embodied in the G20’s collective efforts to raise growth by 2 
per cent over five years. In 2015, countries need to implement what they 
have already committed to — in particular, measures for employment 
and investment (which the IMF and OECD have estimated could 
comprise 56 per cent of the G20’s growth ambition).5  
The G20 can also promote inclusiveness by supporting initiatives that 
target women and youth. The G20 made headway at the Brisbane 
Summit in setting a target to reduce the gap between male and female 
labour participation by 25 per cent by 2025, which is estimated to bring 
100 million women into the labour force.6 If the G20 is to make inroads 
into this substantial promise, it needs to outline the baseline for 
measurement and the ‘bricks along the road’ towards 2025. G20 officials 
should work with international organisations to develop a report for 
leaders in Antalya that includes milestones, timeframes, and country 
goals, while acknowledging key challenges and potential risks to the 
implementation timeframe. Further, with youth unemployment reaching 
13 per cent globally in 2014, three times higher than adult 
unemployment, the G20 could look to set an ambitious youth 
unemployment target.7 Setting a target would add to current G20 plans 
for unemployed youth by helping to monitor the impact of policy 
interventions, thereby helping to address a complex problem.  
The Turkish hosts also place a stronger emphasis on SMEs, an effort 
supported by the G20 membership and various civil society and 
business groups.8 This will include the development of a new ‘SME 
                                                
4 Lawrence Summers, “Bold Reform is the Only Answer to Secular Stagnation,” 
Financial Times, 7 September 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/4be87390-352a-
11e4-aa47-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3V9oCGezi. 
5 IMF and OECD, Quantifying the Impact of G-20 Members’ Growth Strategies, report 
delivered to G20 Brisbane Leaders’ Summit, November 2014, https://g20.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/quantifying_impact_g20_members_growth_strategies.pdf.  
6 Hannah Wurf, “The G20 Can Help Women Enter the Global Economy,” The Interpreter 
(blog), 9 March 2015.  
7 Ali Babacan, “Opening Address at the T20 Launch Event,” (speech: Istanbul, 24 
February 2014). 
8 Ibid. 
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alliance’ that will ensure SMEs have a voice at international platforms. 
Further questions that are likely to be explored in 2015 include how to 
make SMEs a stronger part of the value chain from banking regulations 
to international trade, and how to incorporate the needs of SMEs into the 
international tax agenda.9 
However, not all are convinced by the broader approach and there are 
some who think the G20 needs to focus more on areas with clear 
multilateral gains. Leon Berkelmans’ paper argues that the best thing a 
country can do to achieve inclusive growth is to implement policies that 
aim for strong, sustained growth overall. He proposes that the G20 can 
play an important role in improving the living standards of the poor, but 
that this does not necessarily require an inclusive growth narrative. 
Sceptical of the G20’s capacity to implement country-specific actions, he 
suggests that the G20’s inclusiveness agenda should focus on 
international taxation and climate change. 
IMPLEMENTATION 
The Turkish Presidency has also emphasised that 2015 will be a year of 
‘doing’ rather than ‘talking’ and that this year will see substantive 
progress in policy implementation.10 Davutoğlu claims that Turkey “will 
spare no effort in fulfilling its critical responsibilities, to steer the platform 
so that we achieve our ambitious targets.”11 In particular, the hosts have 
placed great emphasis on the need for the G20 to deliver on the growth 
strategies that leaders endorsed in Brisbane. If fully implemented, the 
1000 plus commitments, macroeconomic policies, and reforms are 
estimated by the IMF and OECD to raise economic growth by more than 
2 per cent over a five year period, delivering better living standards and 
jobs. 
This year, the G20 will need to demonstrate how much of the ‘more than 
2 per cent’ has been delivered since Brisbane, and explain what further 
steps will be needed in future years. Even with the best of intentions, not 
all measures will be implemented, and it is clear that members will need 
to lift their ambition and that additional measures will need to be 
announced. Given the central position of growth in the G20’s narrative, 
the implementation of country commitments is critical to the credibility of 
the G20.  
                                                
9 Ibid. 
10 “Introductions and Leaders' Perspectives: Building the world we want to live in,” G20 - 
The Australian Summit: Brisbane, Newsdesk Media and G20 Research Group at 
University of Toronto, November 2014.  
11 World Bulletin, “Turkish Presidency of G20 Focuses on Action for All,” World 
Bulletin/News Desk, 2 December 2014, 
http://www.worldbulletin.net/news/149711/turkish-presidency-of-g20-focuses-on-action-
for-all. 
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However, as John Kirton and Julia Kulik note, IMF, OECD, and World 
Bank forecasts have not yet accounted for G20 actions, even 15 months 
into the five year plan. They point to an inherent contradiction in global 
economic policy-making: the gloomy forecasts by international 
organisations are at odds with the apparent success of collective G20 
efforts to lift growth. Critics argue that the G20’s collective growth 
ambition was doomed from the beginning because it relied on domestic 
actions and the G20 lacks the enforcement mechanisms to guarantee 
that members comply with their commitments. Proponents of the growth 
target argue that the headline figure is secondary, and that the real 
policy achievements come from members agreeing to take actions that 
they otherwise would not have. Now that the commitments have been 
made, it is up to domestic constituencies to hold leaders to account.  
The credibility of the growth strategies therefore depends on monitoring 
the policy commitments. The G20 is relying on internal peer review and 
an IMF assessment to be delivered to leaders in November 2015. These 
efforts reflect a great advancement on previous G20 accountability 
processes, and the G20 should be rightly commended for committing to 
many more measures than in previous leaders’ summits. That said, 
more could be done to engage the public. In particular, there has been 
little public discussion of G20 commitments and a noted lack of public 
criticism when leaders have not fulfilled their respective promises. 
Countries vary in how much of their growth strategies they disclose, and 
few people are able to ascertain what their leaders have specifically 
committed to. The G20 missed an opportunity to publicly release a 
comprehensive and easy-to-access list of the 1000-plus measures and 
the IMF/OECD methodology used to calculate their growth impact. 
Kirton and Kulik propose some new public accountability mechanisms 
that could lead to more active public engagement. 
INVESTMENT 
Boosting investment remains a long-standing challenge facing all G20 
governments, and recent presidencies have placed it high on their list of 
priorities.12 However, it has been difficult for the G20 to move beyond 
rhetoric, and for its members to undertake concrete measures that 
actually increase investment. Stephen Grenville considers Turkey’s 
ambitious ‘supply-side’ goals to raise public investment levels through 
the preparation of country investment plans that tackle ‘the bottlenecks 
                                                
12 Tristram Sainsbury, “Policies for the Turkish 2015 G20 Presidency: Walking a 
Tightrope of G20 Relevancy,” in The G20 at the End of 2014, G20 Monitor No. 15 
(Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2015). 
…there has been little 
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impeding growth’. The hosts appear to have hit a stumbling block in 
achieving consensus support from the G20 membership.13  
Attention is now likely turn to ‘demand-side’ solutions, including 
enhancing project preparation and the encouragement of private-public 
partnerships (PPPs). Grenville’s paper cautions against the overuse of 
PPPs and outlines the important considerations when deciding between 
types of investment. Greater opportunities are likely to come from 
progressing the G20’s multi-year global infrastructure initiative, and in 
particular, the Global Infrastructure Hub that leaders announced at the 
Brisbane Summit. 
The implementation of the Hub will be critical to G20 efforts to 
demonstrate that it is able to take real action on investment. Ideally, 
2015 should see the consolidated database of infrastructure projects 
made accessible to G20 members, reports of firm steps in the 
development of the knowledge-sharing platform and network of those 
involved in infrastructure projects, and the presentation of clear, albeit 
preliminary, examples in which the Hub has matched investors with 
appropriate projects. Operational arrangements for the Hub, including 
the CEO and staffing, should be announced as soon as possible. 
HEALTH  
When he addressed the Think20 2015 launch event of the Turkish 
Presidency, Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Ali Babacan 
asked the network of G20 think tanks to “develop new initiatives, new 
ideas, new polices, and new projects” that would overcome the G20’s 
areas of “professional blindness.”14 Hannah Wurf and I explore one 
such area: the potential for the G20 to address the gaps in global health 
governance. The Ebola epidemic demonstrated that cross-border health 
security adds an important dimension to long-term economic resilience. 
We suggest that the G20 develop a narrowly targeted global health risk 
agenda, focused on improving WHO operations, increasing health risk 
surveillance, and securing the development of medicines and vaccines 
that predominantly benefit the poor. 
                                                
13 Dasha Afansieva and Orphan Coskun, ‘G20 Plan for Investment Targets Runs into 
Stiff Opposition,” Reuters, 9 February 2015, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/09/us-g20-meeting-idUSKBN0LC08720150209. 
14 Ali Babacan, “Opening Address at the T20 Launch Event.” 
…implementation of the 
Hub will be critical to G20 
efforts to demonstrate 
that it is able to take real 
action on investment. 
 INVESTMENT, INCLUSIVENESS, IMPLEMENTATION, AND HEALTH GOVERNANCE 
 
8  
 
INCLUSIVE GROWTH IS 
GROWTH 
LEON BERKELMANS1 
The G20 was at its best in April 2009. In London that month, G20 
leaders agreed to mobilise funds for the IMF and other multilateral 
lenders. This was a performance from the top shelf. Leaders coalesced, 
in quick time, around an urgent need, and addressed it. The need was 
international, and the solution could only be provided in a multilateral 
environment such as the one the G20 provides. 
The G20, however, seems much less effective when addressing issues 
that are national in scope. And the reasons are clear. Policy-making on 
national issues involves competing priorities and vested interests that 
are powerful within a nation’s boundaries. The G20 has little power in 
such fights, especially when the gains from international coordination are 
limited. 
The G20 therefore needs to pick its battles carefully. It should focus its 
attention on where it can wield real influence. Its attention is now focused 
on the three ‘i’s of the Turkish Presidency: inclusiveness, 
implementation, and investment. While not passing judgement on the 
latter two of the three ‘i’s in this paper, I hold great fears that 
‘inclusiveness’ is an area where the gains from international coordination 
appear small, and where the G20’s voice will be overpowered by 
domestic politics. 
In setting out the priorities for the Turkish Presidency, Turkish Prime 
Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu stated: “We must ensure that the benefits of 
growth and prosperity are shared by all segments of the society.”2 I 
therefore begin this paper by considering the biggest development in 
economic growth over the past 30 years, if not longer: China. I ask how 
China’s growth has affected the less well-off in other countries, both 
developed and developing. Looking forward, I conclude that China can 
benefit the less well-off most by just continuing to grow. I then focus 
attention on the domestic effects of any given country’s growth and 
again conclude that the best way to increase the incomes of the poor, 
wherever they live, is through economic expansion. I finish by identifying 
some issues where the G20 can play an important, even decisive, role, 
in affecting the living standards of the poor, without having to invoke 
‘inclusive growth’; namely climate change and taxation.  
                                                
1 Director, International Economy Program and G20 Studies Centre, Lowy Institute for 
International Policy. 
2 Turkish G20 Presidency, Turkish G20 Presidency Priorities for 2015, 1 December 
2014, https://g20.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/2015-TURKEY-G-20-PRESIDENCY-
FINAL.pdf. 
 INVESTMENT, INCLUSIVENESS, IMPLEMENTATION, AND HEALTH GOVERNANCE 
 
9
 
WHAT ONE COUNTRY CAN DO FOR OTHERS: THE 
CASE OF CHINA 
Since the beginning of economic reforms in 1978, the Chinese economy 
has increased in size around 25-fold, for an average growth rate per 
year of around 10 per cent. This growth is unprecedented. Chinese 
growth has led to high demand for commodities and increasing 
commodity prices. These price increases have been a major channel 
through which Chinese growth has affected other countries. 
Has this been good or bad for the less well-off in other countries? It 
depends upon whether the less well-off are net consumers of 
commodities or net producers of commodities. This differs across 
countries, so there is unlikely to be any hard and fast rule for the impact. 
Even if the overall effect were not ambiguous, what should be done 
about it? The effects of commodity prices reflect simple demand and 
supply forces. There is little that governments should do to directly 
intervene, except to make sure that price signals are properly reflected in 
consumption and production decisions — but this is a domestic decision 
that will be primarily influenced by domestic political economy 
considerations. 
Chinese growth has also affected the price of goods it supplies. China 
primarily exports manufactures, historically at the low end of the value 
chain, but increasingly it is moving towards higher-end products. These 
exports have pushed down the price of these goods. The effects on the 
lower end of the income distribution in other countries will, again, be 
dependent upon whether they tend to be producers of these goods or 
consumers of them. It may be that some of the poor have their wages 
competed down by the labour force in China, but there may be other 
elements, depending upon the country, that benefit from $20 microwave 
ovens. And we are again left with the question: what should be done to 
directly address these forces of supply and demand, even if the effects 
were unambiguous? The answer is probably not much. 
This is not to deny that China’s growth, or the growth of any country, has 
aggregate spillovers. For example, in a recent paper Dani Rodrik points 
out that the growth of East Asian exports appears to have adversely 
affected industrial growth in Latin America.3 However, the optimal 
response to these spillovers would be unlikely to come from a grand 
bargain between states. There is certainly very little that falls into the 
core competency of the G20 that could help address these effects. 
Rather, it would seem that Latin American countries should adopt 
policies to assist in the growth and development of their own economies, 
a process primarily dependent upon their internal political economies. 
                                                
3 Dani Rodrik, Premature Deindustrialization, NBER Working Paper No. 20935, 
February 2015. 
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There is something, nonetheless, that China could do to help the world’s 
poor: keep growing. Take the example of Latin America. As China 
moves up the value chain, it would no longer be in direct competition 
with industries in those countries. Also, as it develops, China’s foreign 
investment program will expand, providing much-needed formal-sector 
jobs, notably in places like Africa. Moreover, China’s continued growth 
will take it closer to the innovative frontier. It will contribute more to 
scientific progress and deliver more solutions to the problems the world 
faces. That will be good for all — rich or poor, developed or 
undeveloped. 
INCLUSIVE GROWTH IS…GROWTH 
So, it would seem that the best thing that China can do to promote 
inclusive growth in other countries is to just…grow. I would argue that 
this is true of other countries too. The world is benefiting right now from a 
strengthening US economy, but the problems in Europe, although 
possibly receding, are doing nothing to help the poor. 
If growth is the main way countries can help others, what can they do to 
help the poor in their own backyards? Again, the answer seems to be, 
simply, grow. That is a claim forcefully made in a classic paper by Dollar 
and Kraay, which has since been updated by Dollar, Kleineberg, and 
Kraay.4  
The updated study uses a panel covering 118 countries across four 
decades to investigate the relationship between the growth of incomes of 
those at the bottom of the income distribution, and the growth of the 
overall economy. They find a robust one-to-one relationship; if an 
economy grows by 1 per cent, the incomes of the poor also tend to grow 
by 1 per cent. Interestingly, they find that growth is most pro-poor in Latin 
America, where the relationship is slightly above one-to-one, and least 
pro-poor in Asia, where it is slightly below. However, because Asia grew 
the most, the poor in those countries actually saw the most growth in 
their incomes compared with the poor in other countries. 
These authors found it difficult to identify any policies that make growth 
more pro-poor, concluding that:  
There is no robust evidence that certain policies are particularly 
‘pro-poor’ or conducive to promoting ‘shared prosperity’ other 
than through their direct effects on overall economic growth.5  
                                                
4 David Dollar and Aart Kraay, “Growth is Good for the Poor,” Journal of Economic 
Growth, 7, (2002): 195–225 and David Dollar, Tatjana Kleineberg, and Aart Kraay, 
Growth Still is Good for the Poor, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 6568 
(World Bank: 2013). 
5 Ibid. 
…the best thing that 
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The importance of growth is paramount. They find that 77 per cent of the 
cross-country variation in growth in incomes of the poorest 40 per cent of 
the population is due to variation in the growth of average incomes. 
This point was also made in the context of the United States in the 2015 
Economic Report of the President.6 Focusing on the middle class rather 
than the poor, the report showed that if inequality had remained constant 
from 1973, the income for the typical household would have been $9000 
higher than current levels. However, if productivity growth had continued 
on its pre-1973 trend, then the median household income would have 
been $30 000 higher.  
Nonetheless, inequality has touched a nerve of late. The drive to focus 
on inclusive growth in the G20 is evidence of that. So also is the 
phenomenon of Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century.7 
In the early chapters of his remarkably popular book, Piketty challenges 
the Kuznets curve, the claimed empirical regularity that inequality initially 
rises with income, then falls as an economy develops. 
This is all well and good. Piketty may be right, but this need not imply 
that growth leads to inequality. Indeed, if any meme from Piketty’s book 
has penetrated the public psyche, it is r-g, where r is the interest rate and 
g is growth. In Piketty’s analysis, capital income plays an important part 
in inequality, and capital income is, in part, determined by the wealth to 
income ratio. A high interest rate leads to more wealth accumulation 
because the holders of wealth earn a higher return. However, growth 
reduces inequality by expanding the denominator in the wealth to 
income ratio. So, in fact, in Piketty’s framework, growth is instrumental in 
bringing inequality down.  
CAN THE G20 DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT? 
It appears, then, that inclusive growth is just growth. So what determines 
that? Prior to Piketty’s book, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson 
were at the top of the international bestsellers list with Why Nations Fail.8 
This book brought to the table more than a decade’s worth of work by 
the authors, and others, on the importance of domestic institutions in 
determining growth. In particular, it is the power of elites, and whether 
institutions are extractive — so the fruits are enjoyed by the elite alone, 
or inclusive — where the rewards from economic growth are widely 
shared, which fundamentally determines economic performance. 
                                                
6 Council of Economic Advisors, 2015 Economic Report of the President, 19 February 
2015. 
7 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, trans. Arthur Goldhammer 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014). 
8 Daron Acemoglu and James Robsinson, Why Nations Fail (New York: Random 
House, 2012). 
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There is little to nothing in Acemoglu and Robinson’s popular and 
influential framework to suggest that international pressure will have a 
significant effect on domestic institutions, other than some isolated 
examples, such as the case of South Africa. However, the international 
community (including an organisation like the G20) is just not powerful 
enough to drive domestic reform. The G20 has a hard enough time 
winning over national assemblies on topics that are its bread and butter; 
consider the difficulties IMF reform faces in the US Congress. 
But have not we just seen the completion of a successful Australian 
Presidency, where countries rallied around a growth agenda and made 
commitments that will increase global growth by two percentage points? 
I think this is the exception that proves the rule. The Australian 
Presidency had a laser-like focus on growth. However, the IMF and the 
World Bank do not appear to have changed their forecasts of world 
growth in response to the agreement.9 This is despite the fact that the 
IMF was involved in measuring the predicted impact of the 2014 
commitments. It seems that international organisations either accounted 
for the fact that these actions would have likely gone ahead in G20 
countries regardless of the agreement, or they suspect that the 
commitments are not going to be implemented in full. In any case, it 
leaves questions about whether or not international soft power has much 
influence on domestic growth policies. 
TAX AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
There is still a role for the G20 to assist the world’s poor. It just has to be 
focused on areas where international agreement is feasible, even 
necessary, for success, while at the same time avoiding weighing in on 
political fights that are national in scope. A number of areas spring to 
mind. 
The poor are especially vulnerable to any changes in climate, and 
measures to address climate change will certainly have to be part of an 
international agreement.10 While there are powerful domestic forces 
pitted in battles over climate change, it is unlikely that there can be any 
meaningful action without international agreement. The G20 can 
facilitate that international agreement, for example on either an 
emissions trading scheme or a carbon tax. These responses require 
collective action, and so is exactly the kind of thing the G20 should focus 
on. 
                                                
9 This is explored in more detail in John Kirton and Julia Kulik, “Advancing G20 
Accountability” in Investment, Inclusiveness, Implementation, and Health Governance, 
G20 Monitor No. 16 (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2015). 
10 World Bank Group, Turn Down the Heat: Confronting the New Climate Normal, 
Report No. 3 (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2014). 
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International taxation is also an area where the G20 is well placed to 
generate good outcomes. The ability of multinational companies to pay 
only small amounts of tax on their profits has been politically challenged 
over the last year, and moves are afoot to help redress the balance. This 
matters for the distribution of income because capital income is typically 
earned by the wealthy. If capital income avoids taxation, then more of a 
burden must be borne by labour income. Add this to the trend of a lower 
labour share of income across the world, and the squeeze on labour 
becomes even more acute.11  
Coordinating the response to these developments seems like something 
the G20 is perfectly poised to do. It is an area that needs international 
cooperation and coordination to be effective. If there are countries that 
do not participate, this may leave loopholes that can be exploited. In this 
regard, coordinated changes to transfer pricing rules, for example, are 
welcome, and will hopefully be effective. There is also a role here for 
developed countries to coordinate on providing assistance and taxation 
capacity building to developing countries, as is happening now. This can 
ensure that developing countries collect revenues that are their due, 
while at the same time ensuring they do not act as a haven for others to 
avoid tax. 
                                                
11 Loukas Karabarbounis and Brent Neiman, “The Global Decline in the Labor Share,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129 (2014): 61–103.  
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ADVANCING G20 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
JOHN KIRTON AND JULIA KULIK1 
At the Brisbane Summit in November 2014, G20 leaders announced an 
ambitious promise to raise their countries’ growth by 2 per cent or more 
above the baseline estimated in October 2013 by 2018. They created 
the Brisbane Action Plan (BAP), containing about 1000 specific steps 
they would collectively take to meet this goal. The IMF and OECD added 
up these steps and certified that they were enough to reach the goal — if 
they were implemented in full. 
In a bright burst of hope, the G20 promised to implement the Brisbane 
growth strategy with the aid of an accountability mechanism. They thus 
correctly recognised that the product is the process; that producing the 
promised growth depends critically on the process of implementation by 
monitoring and assessing how well each step is being undertaken and 
by whom, bringing the laggards up to speed, and adjusting or adding 
action as needed to meet the goal. The achievement of the BAP and the 
overall credibility of G20 governance depend critically on such an 
accountability process.2 However, the G20 missed a great opportunity by 
not publicly releasing a central list of the measures and the IMF/OECD 
methodology, to allow proposals to be assessed by citizens. It is 
therefore difficult for citizens to hold leaders to account for their growth 
commitments, and the international community has been robbed of an 
important enforcement channel. 
Three months after the Brisbane Summit, when G20 finance ministers 
and central bank governors met in Istanbul, implementation did not 
appear to be on track. The IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
released on 19 January 2015 revealed that the rate of growth had 
dropped, but as with other recent forecasts by international 
organisations, it did little to acknowledge G20 efforts to boost growth.3 
G20 ministers and governors then gloomily emphasised that growth was 
slow, slowing, and uneven, demand weak, job prospects bleak, income 
inequality rising, and trade growth low. But no new actions were pledged 
to fill the gap. 
                                                
1 Professor of Political Science and Director of the G8 Research Group, and Co-director 
of the G20 Research Group, University of Toronto; and Senior Researcher for the 
Global Governance Program, University of Toronto. 
2 Mike Callaghan, “The Growth Dilemma and G20 Credibility,” (paper prepared for The 
Challenge of Global Governance and Macroeconomic Coordination, Think 20 Meeting, 
Istanbul, 9–10 February 2015). 
3 IMF, World Economic Outlook Update, 19 January 2015 (Washington DC: IMF, 2015). 
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In all, although an improvement on previous processes, the 
accountability process launched in Brisbane had some flaws that the 
Istanbul meeting did little to ameliorate. However, the G20 can be put 
back on track. G20 countries have a respectable record of complying 
with their previous summit commitments and the Turkish Presidency has 
identified implementation as a priority in 2015. Given the clear 
commitment of G20 members to boost growth and the accumulating 
evidence about what actually improves implementation, an effective 
accountability architecture can still be built to assist Antalya to achieve its 
growth goal. This paper suggests how. 
A FIRM FOUNDATION 
In identifying and introducing this action-oriented accountability 
architecture, there are three pillars on which to build. 
First, past G20 summits have a respectable record of implementation.4 
The best publicly available compliance data, produced by the G20 
Research Group at the University of Toronto and the Higher School of 
Economics in Moscow since 2009, shows that the system works in 
adequately delivering the decisions made.5 The 130 priority summit 
commitments assessed for members’ subsequent compliance from the 
nine summits held thus far show that compliance has always been 
positive, but not evenly so. It was high for Washington at 83 per cent, 
plunged for London to 54 per cent then rose for Pittsburgh to 67 per 
cent, and has stayed at about or above 70 per cent since. 
Second, this data has started to show which accompanying 
accountability processes actually assist implementation. These are 
particular compliance catalysts contained in the commitment, notably a 
one-year or short-term timetable, priority placement, and reference to the 
core multilateral organisation for the issue rather than multiple 
multilateral organisations. Reinforcement from subsequent finance 
ministers’ meetings indirectly helps. The arrival of independent 
accountability assessments of G20 summit compliance is consistent with 
the rising trend in that compliance since 2009.  
Third, the Turkish Presidency has said from the start that implementation 
stands first alongside investment and inclusiveness as the three key 
Antalya Summit themes. Turkey’s leaders have repeatedly promised that 
they would publicly assess the compliance of all G20 members with all 
G20 commitments, in an ongoing and transparent fashion. However, 
Turkey has not yet publicly identified how it will do so, nor if it is already 
doing so or will only start in November after the Antalya Summit ends. 
                                                
4 John Kirton, G20 Governance for a Globalized World, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013). 
5 For further information, see the G20 Information Centre, University of Toronto, 2014, 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/summits/2014brisbane.html.  
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This raises key questions: will this particular approach to accountability 
assessment work, and why wait another year to start? 
DEVELOPMENTS AT THE BRISBANE SUMMIT 
Although an improvement on previous G20 accountability processes, the 
Brisbane Summit’s process on implementation and accountability has its 
flaws.  
In their unusually short communiqué, leaders did not give their ‘2 per 
cent plus’ promise priority placement. When it appeared in Paragraph 3, 
they did not directly commit to reaching it, but merely described what 
had already been done.6 They did not identify the baseline, the 
component commitments, or the number of commitments. They noted 
the need for members’ commitments to be “fully implemented” but did 
not specify interim targets or a timetable with short-term instalments for 
the following five years.  
In Paragraph 4, the G20 leaders proclaimed: 
We will monitor and hold each other to account for implementing 
our commitments, and actual progress toward our growth 
ambition, informed by analysis from international organisations. 
We will ensure our growth strategies continue to deliver and will 
review progress at our next meeting.7 
Yet how they would do this remained unclear. What was clear was that a 
progress review would wait for a full year, with no chance for the public 
to engage in efforts to identify and act on any shortfalls arising 
beforehand. 
Nor did the leaders personally help the cause. As host, Australian Prime 
Minister Tony Abbott started the summit by identifying two Australian 
commitments he said would be politically tough to keep. This soon 
proved to be the case. Even if raising the costs of seeing a doctor and 
going to university were smart, surefire ways to generate growth, the 
Australian government was forced at home to abandon these promises 
within months. Moreover, right after the summit, Australian Treasurer 
Joe Hockey revealed that Australia’s total commitments added up to a 
1.2 per cent rather than a 2 per cent boost. No one said what other 
members’ totals were.  
To be sure, the fine print of the eight-page BAP and the two-page 
Accountability Assessment Framework accompanying the communiqué 
did invoke a few items intended to improve implementation. But within 
the G20, leadership on accountability appeared to be assigned to almost 
                                                
6 G20, G20 Leaders’ Communiqué, Brisbane, November 2014. 
7 Ibid.  
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everyone, and thus no one. Outside the G20 it was given to several 
other international organisations, with the IMF and OECD assigned the 
lead. Progress reports through the year would be about accountability 
“discussions” rather than findings, and about the growth “strategies,” not 
about boosting G20 GDP by more than 2 per cent by 2018. This would 
all be done in private, as G20 finance ministers and central bank 
governors and the bodies they controlled engaged in ‘peer pressure’, 
presumably without peer protection, to give themselves their own 
grades. 
Three months later, all outsiders saw was that the BAP was not reliably 
and rapidly moving towards the 2 per cent plus goal. The WEO of 19 
January 2015 said global growth in 2015 would be only 3.5 per cent, 
down from the 3.8 per cent it had estimated on 7 October 2014.8 Growth 
was downgraded in all major G20 member countries, with the exception 
of the United States and the United Kingdom. The rest of the G7 was 
downgraded. China fell by 0.3 per cent, India by 0.8 per cent, and 
Russia (radiating geopolitical risk) by a stunning 3.5 per cent. 
Geopolitical tensions received only one brief reference in the Brisbane 
communiqué, which was silent about the war in Iraq and the plummeting 
price of oil.  
The OECD’s Going for Growth Report released on 9 February 2015 
identified important areas where the pace of reform had declined. 
Growth had “slowed in most advanced economies…and had remained 
weak, and has even been declining, in…most euro area core countries.”9 
For the United States, it highlighted declining labour force participation, 
and for China, the need for a level playing field and less state 
involvement in business, financial sector reform, and improved tertiary 
education.10 
These forecasts have an important link to the G20 and are the next 
logical stage in ensuring that policy commitments will actually add to 
economic growth. That the IMF, OECD, and World Bank consistently fail 
to account for the G20 actions in their forecasts, on both a quantitative 
and qualitative basis, suggests one of two things: that the effects of 
growth strategies have been already accounted for and therefore do not 
need to be acknowledged, or that the international organisations do not 
yet believe that the measures will have an appreciable effect on growth. 
It was always unlikely that growth would be achieved in a linear fashion, 
but the January 2015 forecasts occurred 15 months after the October 
                                                
8 IMF, World Economic Outlook. 
9 OECD, “Ambitious Reforms Can Create a Growth Path that is Both Strong and 
Inclusive, OECD Says,” news release, 9 February 2015, 
http://www.oecd.org/economy/ambitious-reforms-can-create-a-growth-path-that-is-both-
strong-and-inclusive.htm. 
10 OECD, Going for Growth, 9 February 2015, 
http://oecd.org/economy/goingforgrowth.htm. 
…all outsiders saw was 
that the BAP was not 
reliably and rapidly 
moving towards the  
2 per cent plus goal. 
 INVESTMENT, INCLUSIVENESS, IMPLEMENTATION, AND HEALTH GOVERNANCE 
 
18  
 
2013 baseline, or 25 per cent of the way into the five year commitment. 
In either case, there has been little from international organisations to 
date to suggest that growth will actually be delivered.  
INCREMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS AT ISTANBUL 
Incremental improvements came from G20 finance ministers and central 
bank governors at their meeting in Istanbul on 9–10 February 2015.  
The Istanbul communiqué began by highlighting the slower growth and 
greater risks that had appeared during the preceding three months. 
Ministers and governors declared:  
Against this backdrop, we are determined to overcome these 
challenges and deliver on our leaders’ commitment to achieve 
our objective of strong, sustainable and balanced growth, and to 
create jobs and foster inclusiveness.11  
The 2 per cent plus target had been de-emphasised in their 
communiqué.  
The broader BAP appeared in Paragraph 7. Finance ministers and 
central bank governors again promised the “effective and timely 
implementation” of their growth strategies, but added that they would 
review them “to ensure that they remained appropriate in light of 
changing circumstances.” This implied that they could be deemed 
inappropriate, and thus adjusted or even abandoned. This could create 
confusion rather than confidence about staying the course, especially as 
there was no hint that stronger additional growth-boosting action could 
result. 
To conduct the review they introduced an accountability self-assessment 
that diminished and delayed the realisation of the goal. Ministers and 
governors declared: 
Thus, we agreed to develop a robust framework to hold each 
other to account and monitor progress towards our collective 
growth ambition. While we remain committed to implement our 
entire growth strategies, we will consolidate our monitoring 
mechanism by mostly focusing on the key commitments that 
have the greatest impact on growth. We will present the first 
accountability report of the implementation of our growth 
strategies at the Antalya Summit.12 
Left unexplained was why the governments of the world’s 19 most 
powerful countries and the EU, along with their mighty multilateral 
                                                
11 G20, G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Communiqué, Istanbul, 
February 2015.  
12 Ibid. 
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organisation partners, which had had the capacity to make and assess 
the initial 1000 or so commitments, could now not monitor the 
implementation of all or most of them. It was unclear which commitments 
were considered key, how this would be determined, and who would 
decide.  
Elsewhere, on the G20’s financial reform agenda, finance ministers 
admirably recognised “the importance of timely, full and consistent 
implementation of agreed reforms” but agreed only to “look forward to 
the Financial Stability Board’s annual report that will address the 
progress of implementation and effects of financial regulatory reforms.”13 
Receiving a routine progress report once a year from a group they 
controlled was all that was considered necessary. On the broad 
infrastructure agenda they promised only that “we will closely monitor 
progress in preparation of toolkits to assist developing countries in 
implementing the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting actions.” On terrorism 
they just urged “all countries to speed-up their compliance with the 
relevant standards.” On Ebola and health, they merely welcomed 
“progress made by international organizations to assist affected 
countries.” On energy, they offered nothing at all. 
ADVANCING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ACTION 
There is an urgent need to introduce into the G20 process an 
accountability architecture that actually works. It would be added to what 
the B20 has already agreed, but would add value to and go well beyond 
existing processes in several ways. 
At their upcoming meeting in Washington on 16–17 April, G20 finance 
ministers could publicly report on the accountability assessment 
framework, and on preliminary findings regarding implementing actions 
and growth-enhancing results. They could also reveal the full list of the 
1000 or so Brisbane country commitments along with the estimated 
growth effect of each — as already calculated by the IMF and OECD. 
They could identify the ‘key’ commitments they spoke of at Istanbul, how 
these were chosen, how well they are being implemented, and what 
growth effects they are estimated to have. They would need to do this 
with sufficient detail to enable any interested independent economist or 
other relevant expert to check, confirm, or correct the calculations, and 
on this basis suggest what additional actions could be considered to help 
reach the 2 per cent plus goal. The OECD would assist by starting, in its 
regular Going for Growth reports, to link the reforms of G20 countries to 
their specific Brisbane commitments, and to focus on their 
implementation action in the current year.  
                                                
13 Ibid. 
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G20 finance ministers could further announce that they would hold a 
workshop in the following months where the assessors from G20 
governments, international organisations, leading independent 
economists, and expert compliance assessors would come together to 
compare methods, data, and results, and consider how to improve both 
the accountability process and the actions needed for the desired 
growth. G20 engagement groups such as the Think 20, and non-
government organisations such as Transparency International could also 
contribute.14  
At their September meeting, finance ministers should agree to 
immediately implement those commitments that their leaders made at 
past summits but have not yet been complied with, that contain or 
reinforce Istanbul’s ‘key’ commitments, and that have been certified by 
the multi-stakeholder workshop as most likely to work. To demonstrate 
the serious political commitment of past, present, and future hosts to this 
objective, the leader of Turkey and his troika colleagues should attend 
this meeting, especially if growth patterns and projections continue to 
drop. This meeting would also identify which of the Brisbane 
commitments must be implemented, and by how much, in each of the 
four remaining years in order to hit the 2018 goal. It would further initiate 
analytical work on a multi-disciplinary and multi-stakeholder basis to 
identify how geopolitical risks are harming each of the commitments in 
the Brisbane collection and how the risks for the key commitments could 
best be reduced.  
It is too soon to say with confidence what the resulting shortlist of such 
mid-course corrections should be. But several stand out as attractive 
candidates. The first is the full phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel 
subsidies by 2015, as leaders committed to do at the Pittsburgh Summit 
in 2009. This fulfilment would also contribute to reducing the climate 
change risks in the event of stalled negotiations at the UNFCCC 
Conference of the Parties in Paris in December 2015. A second is 
deficit-friendly, confidence-creating trade liberalisation, by successfully 
concluding the Trans-Pacific Partnership and agreeing to full free trade 
in environmental goods and services among all G20 members and 
others who wish to join.  
There are two overall recommendations for G20 accountability. First, 
produce what you promised in the past. Second, include your domestic 
publics in the process of accountability assessment more actively, for it 
is the national constituencies that political leaders are most responsible 
for and responsive to.15 
                                                
14 Tristram Sainsbury, “Policies for the Turkish 2015 G20 Presidency: Walking a 
Tightrope of G20 Relevancy,” in The G20 at the End of 2014, G20 Monitor No. 15 
(Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2015). 
15 Mike Callaghan, “The Growth Dilemma.” 
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Through such steps, the G20 leaders at Antalya could convincingly and 
credibly declare success by announcing that they are well on the way 
towards meeting their 2018 target, and maybe even that G20 growth at 
the end of 2015 will be at least 2 per cent more than it was estimated to 
be in October 2013. If the best estimates show that they fall short, they 
would commit to self-correction by identifying measures they would 
implement immediately (and add to the Brisbane collection). With 
improved public reporting and a participatory process backing the 
announcement, there would be greater credibility and confidence, 
making accountability assessment a contributor to growth in its own 
right.
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ARE PPPS THE ANSWER FOR 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
DEVELOPMENT? 
STEPHEN GRENVILLE1 
One of the often-heard advantages of private-public partnerships (PPPs) 
is that they can tackle the infrastructure backlog without putting already 
stretched government budgets in further difficulty. PPPs feature largely 
in any discussion of infrastructure.2 The logic is that what cannot be 
funded by the government should be done in partnership with the private 
sector, to be implemented via PPPs.3 Turkish Deputy Prime Minister 
Babacan’s speech to the recent T20 meeting, which immediately 
followed the first finance ministers meeting of the Turkish Presidency, 
captures the essence of this approach: 
Some countries do not have the budgetary room to raise 
investment spending: they have high debt rates, are undergoing 
fiscal consolidation, and are hardly able to cut down budget 
deficits and debt rates. When we ask them to raise investments, 
they talk about budget constraints. Consequently, public-private 
partnerships need to gain more prevalence all around the 
world.4 
The statement provides insight into two important dimensions of the 
Turkish approach to investment during its 2015 G20 presidency. The first 
is that the initial Turkish goals for countries to raise public investment 
levels, including through the preparation of concrete and ambitious 
country investment plans “to tackle the bottlenecks impeding growth” 
and binding targets, appears to have hit a stumbling block in achieving 
consensus support from the G20 membership.5  
The second is that, with investment a core priority of the Turkish G20 
Presidency, attention will likely turn to ‘demand-side’ solutions. This 
                                                
1 Nonresident Fellow, Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
2 PPPs generally refer to a long-term contract between a private party and a 
government agency for providing a public asset or service, for which the private party 
bears significant risk and management responsibility. See Sophia Chong and Emily 
Poole, “Financing Infrastructure: A Spectrum of Country Approaches,” Reserve Bank of 
Australia Bulletin, September 2013. 
3 Australian Government Productivity Commission, Inquiry Report: Public infrastructure, 
14 July 2014, http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/infrastructure/report. See also 
John Quiggin, “Comment on Clifford Winston, ‘How the Private Sector Can Improve 
Public Transportation Infrastructure’,” Financial Flows and Infrastructure Financing, eds. 
Alexandra Heath and Matthew Read, (Sydney: RBA, 2014). 
4 Ali Babacan, “Opening Address at the T20 Launch Event.” 
5 Turkish G20 Presidency, Turkish G20 Presidency Priorities for 2015. 
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could include enhancing project preparation through developing more 
efficient PPPs and better project prioritisation, and exploring new equity-
based modalities of asset-based financing.6 Much of the G20’s role in 
project preparation and prioritisation is to be considered through the 
G20’s multi-year global infrastructure initiative, outlined by finance 
ministers in September 2014, with action to be taken through the Global 
Infrastructure Hub that leaders announced at the Brisbane Summit.7 
Implementation of the Hub needs to be a focus of 2015 efforts if the G20 
is to demonstrate that it is more than a talk shop; that it is able to actually 
take action on this issue.  
In December 2014, Deputy Prime Minister Babacan indicated to G20 
finance officials that Turkey has also asked the World Bank to study how 
to standardise PPPs and make them easier to securitise, with a 
particular emphasis on affordability, feasibility, and risk sharing. This 
paper explores the role of PPPs in more depth.  
PPPs are generally seen as the residual model of choice for investment, 
given: 1) the infrastructure backlog in many countries; 2) the shortage of 
budget funds; and 3) the reluctance (or inability) to fully delegate 
infrastructure ownership and management to conventional private 
enterprise for historic reasons or because of the specific characteristics 
of infrastructure.  
The basis of this approach needs to be questioned. Even the first of the 
three initial conditions is open to debate, although it will not be 
addressed here.8 The second needs some expansion. Although budgets 
around the world are under strain, traditional practice has been to fund 
infrastructure from current revenue. Capital expenditure on infrastructure 
assets should be separated from the current budget. 
The third condition is often based on history (the service has always 
been provided by the state, with the necessary infrastructure owned by 
the government), and there is always inertia inhibiting change. In 
addition, the infrastructure has characteristics that make it difficult or 
impossible to hand over to the free operation of the private sector, 
governed only by the market and the normal rules of commerce. 
Let us look more closely at these last two conditions. 
                                                
6 Ibid. 
7 Tristram Sainsbury, “Policies for the Turkish 2015 G20 Presidency.” 
8 Anne Krueger, “Comment on Jordan Z Schwartz, Fernanda Ruiz-Nuñez, and Jeff 
Chelsky, ‘Closing the Infrastructure Finance Gap: Addressing Risk’,” Financial Flows 
and Infrastructure Financing. 
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DEBT CONSTRAINTS ON THE BUDGET 
Often a budget debt constraint is imposed by law or regulation. In other 
cases it is a practical consideration either to discipline the budgetary 
process (and put constraints on pork-barrel politics) or to reassure 
financial markets (and credit rating agencies).  
Traditional budget accounting complicates the decision-making process 
for investment decisions.9 Infrastructure investment is large-scale and 
long-lived, with the return (whether seen as a stream of revenue or a 
stream of services provided to the public) spread over many years. The 
benefit may also largely accrue to future generations, who might 
reasonably be expected to bear the cost. This suggests that it should be 
funded by debt issue.10 Such debt should be considered differently from 
budget deficit funding on ‘current expenditures’ such as social services. 
It is sensible to put in place restraints to stop current generations from 
leaving this latter sort of debt legacy to future generations.  
The key conceptual distinction comes from the creation of a viable asset. 
When the expenditure creates a viable asset, this is better seen as a 
balance sheet item, where the assets are balanced by the debt liabilities. 
If government accounts were drawn up in this way, it may be both 
feasible and sensible to ease the binding constraints on infrastructure 
debt, and persuade the credit rating agencies that this debt should be 
treated differently in setting credit ratings. Of course, part of this 
assessment is whether the project will earn a self-sustaining flow of 
income. But even if the asset is not financially self-sustaining in that 
sense, proper accounting would treat the asset financing as a balance 
sheet item, with the subsidies/losses included as part of the current 
budget accounting framework, and with the project’s sustainability 
judged in that context. This would allow a logical assessment of the 
fundamental value of the project: can its ongoing subsidies/losses be 
justified? This is a prior and separate matter from the financing. 
The key point here is that viable infrastructure projects will provide 
services to the community for the (usually long) life of the asset, and so 
debt financing of one type or another is justified, serviced, and repaid 
from the earnings stream of the project or, where the project is socially 
justifiable but not self-funding, from budget current expenditures.11 
                                                
9 A common public perception is that increasing government debt is undesirable and 
synonymous with financial imprudence. When governments are deciding to borrow, it is 
important to consider the purpose and the existing level of indebtedness. See Australian 
Government Productivity Commission, Inquiry Report. 
10 John Freebairn and Max Corden, Vision Versus Prudence: Government Debt 
Financing of Investment, Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 
30/13, (Melbourne: Melbourne Institute, 2013). 
11 Of course, if a project cannot justify this expenditure, it should not go ahead in the first 
place. 
Infrastructure investment 
is large-scale and long-
lived, with the return 
spread over many years.
 INVESTMENT, INCLUSIVENESS, IMPLEMENTATION, AND HEALTH GOVERNANCE 
 
25
 
CONSTRAINTS ON PRIVATISATION 
There has been a great increase in private sector infrastructure in recent 
years, reflecting changes in both technology and mindsets. Technology 
has transformed sectors such as telecommunications. Previously this 
would have been considered a natural monopoly, and thus difficult to 
transfer to the private sector. With mobile technology, the normal forces 
of competition can apply.12 But there are also many examples where 
industries once thought of as intrinsically ‘public’ have been privatised, 
with social objectives managed through regulation.  
There has also been a greater readiness to ‘unbundle’ services and 
investment, transferring only part of the process to the private sector. For 
example, the government might maintain ownership of the ‘poles and 
wires’ of electricity supply (seeing these as a utility that should be open 
to all who want to use it to supply consumers), while the private sector 
generates power (with competition from various suppliers) and sells the 
power to individual customers (with competition providing discipline on 
pricing and quality of service). 
There is a strong case for privatisation where the nature of the project is 
suitable. If an infrastructure project is commercially viable, why not allow 
the private sector to implement it as a private enterprise? Not all 
projects, however, will be suitable. Whether a project is retained within 
the public sector or is carried out by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or 
by the private sector depends largely on the nature of the project, not on 
the financing. The special nature of infrastructure (e.g. a utility) may well 
dictate that it stays in the public sector because the regulatory 
challenges of achieving the project aims via private ownership are too 
difficult.13  
The proper decision sequence for infrastructure projects might go like 
this: 
• Does a project pass a rigorous cost-benefit test either as a stand-
alone profitable enterprise or as a public service that justifies public 
subsidies over the lifetime of the project? This weeds out the ‘white 
elephants’. 
• Do the characteristics of the project mean that it is better in the 
public’s hands or under private-sector management? For example, a 
privatised asset should have enough competition to ensure efficient 
                                                
12 Emily Poole, Carl Toohey, and Peter Harris “Public Infrastructure: A Framework for 
Decision-making,” Financial Flows and Infrastructure Financing. See also: Chong and 
Poole, “Financing Infrastructure.” 
13 Some infrastructure characteristics that are more challenging to hand over to private 
sector include: large projects where the investment may lock in specific technology and 
determine expansion options; if there is a natural monopoly; if they are public goods 
with non-excludability complications; and if they require complex regulation and 
performance standards. 
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pricing and appropriate service quality. Could this be achieved 
through regulation or administration of the pricing? Is this a utility-type 
asset that should be open to all potential users?14 
WHEN WILL PPPS BE APPROPRIATE? 
If all the projects that can effectively be done by the private sector are, in 
fact, privatised, then projects suitable for implementation as a PPP are 
likely to be intrinsically ‘public sector’; that is, they require a high degree 
of public involvement. Why not leave them in the hands of the public 
sector? 
In fact, past experience, consistent with this question, suggests fairly 
limited scope for PPPs. Despite the voluminous discussions of PPPs, 
true PPPs have been fairly rare, and very little infrastructure has been 
put in place using this model.15 Australia has been a keen proponent for 
many years, yet only about 5 per cent of infrastructure actually built has 
used the PPP model. PPPs were used to finance less than 10 per cent 
of total public infrastructure investment in a sample of OECD countries.16  
Historically, most PPPs have arisen from financing constraints. These 
were projects that governments did not want to hand over to private 
enterprise, but that could not be funded by official bond issue due to 
constraints on issuing official debt. The best answer here would be to 
remove the constraint, allowing debt within a public balance sheet. If this 
were to be done, PPPs would form an even smaller proportion of 
infrastructure investment. With this in mind, where will PPPs find an 
appropriate role, and how can the government benefit by partnering in 
implementation and longer-term management of an infrastructure 
project?17  
Participation of a private partner may bring skills that are lacking or 
scarce in the public sector during construction and the operational life of 
the project. The PPP format, with its focus on a single project, attention 
to whole-of-life cost-benefit, and sharper management of the private 
sector, could deliver a better outcome for the public.18 Private-sector 
managers may be better placed to avoid over-manning and poor work 
practices. At the same time, the private sector could deliver aspects that 
                                                
14 Rod Sims, “Priorities 2015,” (speech, Committee for Economic Development of 
Australia, Sydney, 19 February 2015), https://www.accc.gov.au/speech/priorities-2015. 
15 True PPPs are distinct from projects where the private sector has provided project 
financing, usually as part of export promotion by the foreign supplier, while the public 
sector retains management control. See also Poole, Toohey, and Harris, “Public 
Infrastructure.” 
16 Ibid. 
17 Australian Government Productivity Commission, Inquiry Report. 
18 Eduardo Engel, Ronald Fischer, and Alexander Galetovic, “Finance and Public-
Private Partnerships,” Financial Flows and Infrastructure Financing. 
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the government is unable to achieve, usually for political reasons, such 
as efficient (user-cost) pricing, especially where a service has 
traditionally been either provided for free or heavily subsidised.19 PPPs 
represent another level of scrutiny, which may weed out poor projects, 
depending on the allocation of responsibilities in the contract.  
Where the private partner arranges the financing, the cost of funds is 
likely to be substantially higher than the risk-comparable cost of 
government financing.20 Infrastructure projects are, by their nature, often 
high-risk. It has frequently proven hard to successfully allocate risk in 
ways envisaged at the start of a project.21 The private sector partner can 
be more skilled at foreseeing how risks will develop over the course of 
the project, and can execute a contract that benefits from these skills. At 
a more basic level, the government has to see the project through to 
completion, even if the PPP contractor is not performing or goes 
bankrupt. The government often has contingent risks that eventuate, 
altering the cost it faces.  
Dividing the project between two parties introduces regulatory risk not 
present for a conventional public project. The profitability of the private 
sector partner depends on pricing decisions made by the public sector 
partner, which is aiming to maximise broader societal objectives. 
Challenges can arise if, say, profit-maximising decisions on capacity are 
not socially optimal. PPPs therefore require good laws and strong 
property rights — otherwise they are too risky and expensive.  
WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR TURKEY’S G20 
INVESTMENT PRIORITY?  
Where PPPs have been undertaken, it has sometimes (perhaps often) 
been for the wrong reason: because the government’s ability to borrow 
was constrained, even for potentially profitable projects with high social 
returns. The only way the project could proceed was as a PPP, with the 
private partner’s main contribution coming from facilitating financing, 
bypassing the public constraint, but perhaps at substantially higher cost.  
A clearer sequencing in the decision process would help correct this 
sub-optimal outcome. First, project proposals should be evaluated for 
intrinsic viability. Finance will be part of this evaluation, as concepts such 
                                                
19 Australian Government Productivity Commission, Inquiry Report. 
20 This is not a straightforward calculation. The government can borrow more cheaply 
than the private sector but the difference between the required return for the private 
sector and the government bond rate overstates the official advantage. It does not allow 
for the risk component borne by the government but funded from general revenue if a 
project operates at a loss. Nevertheless, the financing advantage is great. 
21 Aspects that often cause poor risk transfer include incomplete contracts (i.e. failure to 
deliver), which leave the government with the responsibility of bringing the project to 
completion while the private sector partner goes into liquidation. Renegotiation also puts 
the government in a weaker position because of the need to complete the project. 
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as discounted cash flow will of course be relevant. But whether the 
project is fully privatised, financed by the government, or carried out in 
the form of a PPP, should not be germane in this first stage of the 
decision process.  
If a project passes this test of viability, the choice between public or 
private implementation will depend on the nature of the project, not on 
the financing. Projects whose nature makes them suitable for 
privatisation should be implemented as such. For the residual projects 
that are unsuited to privatisation, whether implementation is done solely 
by the public sector or in partnership with the private sector should 
depend on what extra value the private sector can add, and at what 
cost.22 Financing enters the decision at this stage to the extent that 
public and private cost of funds will differ, even risk-adjusted for 
comparability.23 
Financing capacity can be distorted by government accounting (failure to 
separate current and capital accounts), political constraints, or 
inappropriate credit rating agency assessment frameworks. Where these 
constraints can be removed, the first-best solution is to do so. Much of 
what has happened in the PPP context so far reflects the second-best 
outcome of being unable to remove these constraints. 
G20 countries have a domestic mandate to remove such constraints, 
although the collective G20 role (above and beyond the actions specified 
in the global infrastructure initiative) is less clear. The G20’s main 
contribution to PPPs might be to direct the World Bank and the regional 
development banks to build their technical capacity to take part in the 
detailed national evaluation of specific infrastructure projects, when 
invited to do so by a host country. Such involvement need not be in the 
context of the development banks providing the financing for the projects 
under evaluation. As this paper suggests, financing can best be seen as 
a second-stage decision, after the nature and viability of the project have 
been established.
                                                
22 Engel, Fischer, and Galetovic, “Finance and Public-Private Partnerships.” 
23 Ibid. 
 INVESTMENT, INCLUSIVENESS, IMPLEMENTATION, AND HEALTH GOVERNANCE 
 
29
 
CAN THE G20 HELP PREPARE 
THE WORLD FOR FUTURE 
HEALTH PANDEMICS? 
TRISTRAM SAINSBURY AND HANNAH WURF1 
A legacy of Ebola must be a stronger system to defend world 
health security, with rich countries playing a lead role in helping 
poorer nations strengthen their health systems — Dr Margaret 
Chan, Director-General of the World Health Organization.2 
The 2014 Ebola virus outbreak had terrible humanitarian and economic 
consequences for Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia. It also revealed a 
darker side to the speed and interconnectivity of today’s globalised 
world. The rapid international spread of Ebola exposed gaps in the 
global health governance system and illustrated the potential for 
infectious disease outbreaks to have a significant negative impact on the 
global economy. As the premier international economic forum, what do 
these developments mean for the G20, and what role, if any, should the 
forum play in addressing future cross-border health emergencies?  
This paper argues that when a fast-spreading global health risk 
threatens the confidence and stability of the global economy, it is well 
within the remit of the G20 to respond in its role as a crisis management 
forum. We also argue that there can be a role for an ambitious G20 to 
address global health governance gaps, thereby mitigating the economic 
effects of future health crises. Our fear is that without G20 attention, 
global health governance will remain fragmented, and Margaret Chan’s 
plea for Ebola’s legacy to be a strengthened world health system will be 
ignored. We acknowledge that taking action to address health 
governance would represent a further expansion of the G20’s mandate. 
However, cross-border health security adds an important dimension to 
long-term economic resilience, and an agenda that narrowly targets 
health risks would be a sensible use of G20 time and energy. 
THE CURRENT GLOBAL ARCHITECTURE FOR 
CROSS-BORDER HEALTH EMERGENCIES 
There is a complex global architecture that manages health 
emergencies, involving international organisations, specialised agencies, 
national and subnational health administrations, research institutions, 
                                                
1 Research Fellow, G20 Studies Centre, Lowy Institute for International Policy, and 
Research Associate, G20 Studies Centre, Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
2 Simeon Bennett and Jason Gale, “Ebola Spurs WHO Plan for Health Reserves After 
Missteps,”  , 25 January 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-
25/who-board-proposes-new-fund-and-workforce-to-avoid-ebola-repeat.  
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and private and not-for-profit sector bodies.3 At the centre of this 
architecture is the World Health Organization (WHO), which has 
responsibility for health-related activities within the United Nations, and a 
mandate to monitor emerging health threats and ensure that 
governments collaborate towards “the attainment by all peoples of the 
highest level of health.”4 Financing mechanisms for health include 
national governments, the Bretton Woods institutions, bilateral 
agreements, private foundations, and public-private partnerships.5 
Notwithstanding this complicated global structure, health initiatives are 
generally implemented on a country-by-country basis, due to the 
geographically confined nature of most health issues and the diversity of 
national health systems, which can make it difficult to coordinate actions.  
The clearest role for international health coordination appears to be in 
managing infectious diseases that have the capacity to cross borders. 
Even here, action is largely taken on a domestic basis, with the WHO 
creating the legal framework of International Health Regulations (IHRs) 
in 2005 and fostering a ‘network of networks’. The IHRs are country-
specific commitments designed to act collectively as a global safety net 
in the event of an infectious outbreak, through country cooperation on 
surveillance, communication, and logistics.6 In order to implement the 
IHRs effectively, the system relies upon each country’s capacity to 
detect, assess, report, and respond promptly and effectively to public 
health risks of international importance.7 The varied capacity across the 
194 WHO member states, especially among low-income and developing 
countries, means that at any given time numerous countries will struggle 
to uphold the IHRs, leaving them (and the rest of the world) vulnerable to 
global health risks.8  
For such an integrated global health system to be effective in containing 
emerging health threats, it needs oversight by a technical body that is 
able to monitor vulnerabilities, identify gaps in capacity, inform policy-
makers of gaps and risks, and coordinate international efforts to address 
those gaps and risks. However, the WHO faces challenges in being able 
to provide this oversight, and there is currently no other organisation with 
                                                
3 A useful, if somewhat dated, diagram can be found in Figure 1 of Richard Dodgson, 
Kelley Lee, and Nick Draper, Global Health Governance: A Conceptual Review, 
Discussion Paper (WHO: 2002). Also see Thomas Bollyky, Laurie Garrett, and 
Yanzhong Huang, Global Governance Monitor: Public Health (Council on Foreign 
Relations: 2013). 
4 WHO, Constitution of the World Health Organization, 2006, 
http://www.who.int/governance/eb/who_constitution_en.pdf.  
5 Bollyky, Garrett, and Huang, Global Governance Monitor. 
6 John Mackenzie and Angela Merianos, “The Legacy of SARS,” WHO Western Pacific 
Region Journal, Issue 3, July–September 2013. 
7 WHO, “Alert, Response, and Capacity Building Under the International Health 
Regulations,” accessed March 2015, http://www.who.int/ihr/alert_and_response/en/. 
8 Danielle Renwick and Toni Johnson, “Backgrounders: The World Health 
Organization,” Council of Foreign Relations, 7 October 2014. 
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sufficient capacity. These weaknesses were exposed by the Ebola 
outbreak.  
THE FLAWS IN THE GLOBAL RESPONSE TO EBOLA 
Ebola was discovered in 1976 but small-scale outbreaks had been 
successfully contained prior to 2014.9 The disease appeared in rural 
Guinea in December 2013, and by March 2014, Liberia and Sierra 
Leone had suspected cases.10 By late March, with the WHO reporting 
112 cases and 70 deaths, not-for-profit organisation Medecins Sans 
Frontières had established the first isolation centre in West Africa; the 
US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention had sent a five-person 
team to Guinea; and neighbouring countries had closed borders to 
prevent the spread of disease. In subsequent months the emergency 
continued to escalate, reaching 800 cases and 481 deaths by mid-June 
and culminating in 24 350 cases and 10 004 deaths by 10 March 2015.11 
The world looked expectantly to the WHO to lead the global response. 
However, the organisation was ill-prepared to respond to any global, 
sustained health emergency. The outbreak exposed deep problems with 
the WHO’s funding, structure, and staff, which contributed to the 
organisation’s inability to meet its obligation to scale up investment in 
surveillance and reporting.12  
The WHO is funded by voluntary contributions and faces severe funding 
constraints, headlined by the steady real decline in the WHO’s budget 
since 1994.13 Its two-year budget, which declined from $5 billion in 
2009–10 to $4 billion in 2014–15, leaves it struggling to fund basic 
functions.14 The organisation’s core mandate goes well beyond 
infectious diseases. The WHO is therefore more likely to direct its scarce 
discretionary resources into areas such as primary care and chronic 
disease that make a greater marginal contribution towards improving 
                                                
9 WHO, “Ebola Virus Disease,” Fact Sheet No. 103, September 2014, 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs103/en/. 
10 The Economist, “Ebola in Graphics,” 5 March 2015, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/03/ebola-graphics.  
11 Ibid. 
12 The Economist, “Too Big to Ail,” 11 December 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/news/international/21636038-ebola-has-laid-bare-failings-
worlds-health-authority-too-big-ail, and Mark Siedner and John Kraemer, “The Global 
Response to the Ebola Fever Epidemic: What Took So Long?,” Public Library of 
Science (blog), http://blogs.plos.org/speakingofmedicine/2014/08/22/global-response-
ebola-fever-epidemic-took-long/#more-18147.  
13 Lawrence Summers, “We Play with Fire if We Skimp on Public Health,” Financial 
Times, 9 November 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/2591b4e8-6529-11e4-ab2d-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3Mgpem4wd.  
14 Sheri Fink, “Cuts at W.H.O. Hurt Response to Ebola Crisis,” The New York Times, 3 
September 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/04/world/africa/cuts-at-who-hurt-
response-to-ebola-crisis.html.  
The outbreak exposed 
deep problems with the 
WHO’s funding, 
structure, and staff... 
 INVESTMENT, INCLUSIVENESS, IMPLEMENTATION, AND HEALTH GOVERNANCE 
 
32  
 
‘health for all’, rather than investing in monitoring and controlling 
infectious diseases.  
Funding constraints have led to cuts to the disease surveillance budget 
and a reduction in the number of people in the emergency response 
department from 94 to 34.15 Another consequence is that the IHR regime 
remains critically underdeveloped. In 2013, only 80 (out of 194) countries 
were meeting and sustaining the core capacities required for hazard 
alert and response, and just 100 had surveillance based on international 
standards for epidemic disease. In addition, no African state successfully 
implemented the minimum core capacities required to control outbreaks 
within their borders by the agreed mid-2012 deadline, effectively leaving 
an entire continent ill-prepared to manage emerging cross-border health 
threats.  
It should not have been surprising when a leaked WHO document 
admitted systemic mistakes in the handling of the early stages of the 
epidemic, in basic areas such as staffing and information.16 Facing clear 
evidence that the IHR regime had failed, Margaret Chan claimed at the 
peak of the Ebola crisis that the WHO could only offer technical 
assistance at best, and that it remained up to national governments to 
provide healthcare.17 Yet it was unclear how countries could best 
contribute to global efforts. For example, potential volunteer healthcare 
experts in Australia and Israel, who were able and willing to assist in 
responding to the outbreak, were prevented from doing so due to 
domestic concerns about safety and a lack of clarity about evacuation 
arrangements for infected volunteers. Organisations operating on the 
ground, like Medecins Sans Frontières, did not need further financial 
assistance.18 Chan later admitted that the Ebola outbreak had been a 
mega-crisis that overwhelmed the capacity of the WHO.19  
The leadership vacuum was gradually filled by others, including the 
World Bank, Medecins Sans Frontières, a UN special taskforce, and 
various national governments, particularly the United States. The 
                                                
15 Ibid. 
16 Neha Bhatnaga, “WHO to Investigate its Response to Ebola Outbreak,” BBC News, 
18 October 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/health-29669404.  
17 Sheri Fink, “W.H.O. Leader Describes the Agency’s Ebola Operations,” The New 
York Times, 11 December 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/04/world/africa/who-
leader-describes-the-agencys-ebola-operations.html. 
18 Peter Hartcher, “Ebola: Abbott Government Relents, Will Send Australian Volunteers 
to Treat Victims,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 4 November 2014, 
http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/ebola-abbott-government-relents-
will-send-australian-volunteers-to-treat-victims-20141104-11grgy.html, and Ido Efrati, 
“Israel Wants to Help Ebola-Stricken Nations — But Doesn't Know How,” Haaretz, 13 
October 2014, http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/1.620590. 
19 Stephanie Nebahay, “After Ebola, WHO to Set Up Contingency Fund, Develop 'Surge 
Capacity’,” Reuters, 26 January 2015, http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/01/25/us-health-
ebola-who-idINKBN0KY0KA20150125. 
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coordinated international emergency response has been substantial. In 
early March 2015, approximately $3 billion had been pledged and close 
to $2 billion already paid or firmly committed, although the UN has called 
for an additional $1 billion.20 It currently looks as if Ebola will be 
contained by the end of 2015, but reaching zero new infections will be a 
challenge. The focus is already shifting from emergency containment 
towards ensuring economic recovery in the affected nations.  
Key lessons from the epidemic are that the general lack of investment in 
public health represents a global emergency, and that we have largely 
ignored the infectious diseases that disproportionately kill the world’s 
most vulnerable.21 The G20 can, and should, play a role in contributing 
towards an appropriate response by addressing global governance 
gaps.  
A ROLE FOR THE G20 IN PREPARING THE WORLD 
FOR GLOBAL HEALTH EMERGENCIES 
The G20 works best when its attention to a leader-level issue translates 
into progress that could not otherwise be attained. A ‘G20 issue’ should 
be a vexing problem that justifies a high-level, high-profile process.22 It 
should have global implications, for both advanced and emerging 
economies. There needs to be limited prospects for progress (or even 
the possibility of regression) without senior political impetus. G20 efforts 
should also reinforce the proper role of other international organisations, 
and be clear, well-defined, and of proportionate scale relative to the 
forum’s other priorities.  
It may seem an unlikely forum to respond to health concerns. Until last 
year, health had not warranted a mention in any G20 finance ministers’ 
or leaders’ statements. Health policy, for the most part, remains a 
domestic policy area managed within national borders, and not a matter 
with global implications.  
In September 2014, when finance ministers met in Cairns, they 
expressed concern about the human cost of the Ebola epidemic and its 
potentially serious impacts on growth and stability in the affected 
countries and the wider region, and they underscored the importance of 
a coordinated international response. This response reflected an 
                                                
20 Joshua A. Krisch, “These Donors Pledged $1 Billion To Fight Ebola — And Then 
Never Paid,” Vocactiv, 2 March 2015, http://www.vocativ.com/culture/health-
culture/ebola-money-disappeared/; Simeon Bennett and Makiko Kitamura, “The UN 
Wants Another $1 Billion to Fight Ebola,” Bloomberg, 21 January 2015, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-21/ebola-fight-requires-1-billion-more-
for-un-as-outbreak-weakens.  
21 Lawrence Summers, “We Play with Fire if We Skimp on Public Health.” 
22 Barry Carin and David Shorr, “The G20 as a Lever for Progress,” CIGI G20 Papers 
No. 7 (The Stanley Foundation and the Centre for International Governance Innovation, 
2012). 
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awareness of the economic effects of recent public health scares 
including swine flu, bird flu, and SARS. The largest economic impact 
does not come from the direct humanitarian and economic effects of 
infectious diseases, but rather from people changing their behaviour to 
reduce their risk of exposure, including reduced travel (even to disease-
free countries) and reduced spending to minimise contact with others. 
People tend to take these precautions even if not directly affected by the 
risks, scaling up a local or regional problem to the global level. G20 
finance ministers put their political weight behind coordinated 
international efforts that were best placed to mobilise a technical solution 
to the health problem. They also demonstrated that there can be a role 
for the G20 in providing reassurance and taking the necessary action to 
re-establish confidence, as it did most notably during the global financial 
crisis.  
At the Brisbane Summit in November 2014, with the international 
response to Ebola well advanced, G20 leaders released a joint 
statement that recognised the serious humanitarian, social, and 
economic impact of Ebola. They urged the World Bank and IMF to 
continue their efforts as well as address the possibility of future crises.23 
They also recommitted to the full implementation of the IHR regime and 
pledged to build capacity for IHR in developing countries. Subsequently, 
the WHO announced the creation of a contingency fund of $100 million 
and a public health reserve workforce of 1500 people to continue efforts 
to contain Ebola and to protect against future health emergencies.24 In 
addition to these steps, the IMF has created a $100 million Catastrophe 
Containment and Relief Trust and the World Bank is developing a 
Pandemic Emergency Facility. In May 2015, the World Health Assembly 
will discuss further steps to enhance the IHRs.  
These initiatives are all valuable and welcome; however, there is scope 
for the G20 to do more to advance global health governance. We 
propose the G20 narrowly target the following three areas. 
The first area is the WHO: the G20 should use its political weight to 
reinforce the WHO as the central organisation for responding to health 
crises. There are currently no organisations that can match the reach or 
representativeness of the WHO, although the organisation was clearly 
overwhelmed by Ebola. The G20 should therefore seek to buttress WHO 
capacity so that it can better oversee global surveillance and reporting 
systems, and is able to effectively coordinate the rapid deployment of 
funds, personnel, and medical supplies in a time of crisis.  
Accomplishing this goal requires several steps. G20 leaders should 
provide direction to participants at the World Health Assembly to ensure 
                                                
23 G20, G20 Leaders’ Brisbane Statement on Ebola, November 2014. 
24 Stephanie Nebahay, “After Ebola, WHO to Set Up Contingency Fund.”  
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that there is a more prominent, formal emphasis on managing cross-
border emergencies. G20 leaders could add momentum to increasing 
WHO funding to more appropriate levels, and provide the broad 
parameters for placing its funding structure on a more permanent basis. 
However, the G20 should not be the forum for detailed negotiations. All 
G20 members should commit to develop and maintain national registers 
of health workers and medical supplies that can be deployed in a time of 
emergency. These could be linked to a central register managed by the 
WHO. As part of this, G20 members could develop agreements on the 
provision of relevant medical supplies and on the evacuation 
arrangements and treatment of deployed health workers if they become 
ill.  
The second area where the G20 can act is in health risk surveillance. 
The G20 could consider emerging cross-border health risks in the same 
spirit as emerging cross-border financial and economic risks. There is a 
need for improved flows of information to government decision-makers 
about emerging health risks and their impacts. An expert panel or 
relevant organisations could identify the gaps and capacity constraints in 
multilateral and regional health surveillance. The WHO and its partners 
should then be tasked with updating the G20 on a regular basis about 
any high-level emerging global health risks, their potential economic 
implications, global preparedness to respond, and any international 
efforts needed to fill gaps and manage risks. The G20 should not be 
seen as an ‘action’ body in this regard, but rather as a steering group. 
The third area is medicines and vaccines. The containment of swine flu 
demonstrated the ability of developed economies to quickly manufacture 
a vaccine on a large scale.25 Ebola has demonstrated that the same is 
not the case for low-income and developing countries. The G20 should 
examine arrangements for cooperation between G20 members, 
international organisations, and the private sector on the development of 
vaccines, diagnostic tests, and medicines for infectious diseases that 
would create social benefits but would not be developed as private 
goods. An equal-access framework could follow the example of the 2011 
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework. The Lancet Commission 
urges multilateral action to develop production capacity for vaccines and 
an intellectual property regime that guarantees universal access.26  
Such G20 commitments would be an important step forward in the 
management of the economic effects of future health crises. It would 
also be a notable step in the evolution of the G20, away from responding 
to crises once they emerge, and towards the active prevention of, and 
protection against, future crises.  
                                                
25 Bollyky, Garrett, and Huang, Global Governance. 
26 Dean Jamison et al., “Global Health 2035: A World Converging Within a Generation,” 
The Lancet, 382 (2013): 1898–1955. 
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In the absence of G20 action, the WHO could be strengthened of its own 
accord, particularly by powerful member states pushing for reform. 
However, it is very difficult to see reform of an organisation as big and 
complex as the WHO without the necessary political will. The 
responsibility for advancing aspects of the health agenda might then fall 
to the geopolitical groupings that exist within the G20. For example, the 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) are already working 
as a trade bloc, promoting access to high-quality medicines through the 
WTO.27 Similarly, the G8 has evolved from financing WHO and UN 
health programs to creating its own initiatives, including the Global Fund 
to Fight AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis and the G8 Africa Action Plan. 
At the G8 meeting in St Petersburg in 2006, infectious disease was one 
of Russia’s three priority themes and G8 health ministers met for the first 
time.28 This suggests that if global health governance is not addressed at 
a multilateral level, then health arrangements will continue to evolve 
through bilateral or regional agreements, producing more ad hoc 
solutions.  
In all, the G20 can be an effective forum for taking action to protect the 
world against global health risks, especially cross-border infectious 
diseases that have far-reaching economic consequences in a globalised 
world. 
                                                
27 Ilona Kickbusch, “BRICS’ Contributions to the Global Health Agenda,” WHO Bulletin, 
92, No. 6 (2014): 385–464. 
28 John Kirton, G8 Health Governance, draft paper, 27 January 2015. 
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